Well-being in old age: a philosophical analysis
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The article discusses whether the notion of well-being is invariant or must be relativized with respect to age. For this purpose, it briefly reviews the three main theories of well-being that have been at the center of contemporary philosophical discussion, showing the greater plausibility of the objective list theory over the rivals; it then shows that empirical research on the well-being of the elderly has provided some evidence in favor of this theory. Finally, it defends the view that the list of the objective goods must be adjusted to age, not meaning that the goods in the list change with the passing of time, but that their weight and contribution to the individual well-being is different in different moments of life.
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